THE INCIDENT
A time-line of events is summarised in Table 1 Oslo VAV that between 18th September and 3rd October coliform bacteria had been detected in 9 tap water samples analysed by the company. In 6 of these samples the bacteria had been identified; 4 samples contained Enterobacter amnigenus and 2 samples Serratia fonticola.
In response to this report, on 8th October Oslo VAV took 3 water samples from different points in the water distribution network in the immediate area around the pharmaceutical company facilities. Whilst 2 samples were bacteriologically negative, one sample was positive, with 9 coliforms and 1 E. coli per 100 ml. A repeat sample from this site (10th October) demonstrated 4 coliforms, 4 E. coli, and 2 intestinal enterococci per 100 ml. Based on these results, on 12th October, 3 further water samples were taken for bacteriological analysis and 1 10 L sample for parasitological analysis and a boil-water notice was instituted for a restricted area (3 streets) in the immediate surroundings of the affected locality. One presumptive Giardia cyst (good morphology and fluorescence characteristics of the shell, but empty, and therefore no internal morphology) was detected in the 10 L water sample, which was noted during the analysis as being particularly dirty, with high content of debris and algae. On 13th and 14th
October further samples were taken for bacteriological analysis, both from the previous sampling sites and from 10 new sites. Additionally, it was decided on 15th October to take 4 further samples for parasitological analysis.
On 16th October, neither coliform bacteria, nor E.coli, nor intestinal enterococci were reported to have been detected in the samples taken on 12th October (3 samples), 13th October (13 samples) and 14th October (13 samples), although initial tests had shown possible coliforms but colonies were small and atypical. However, amongst the 4 10L water samples taken for parasitological analysis, which were again noted as being particularly dirty, Cryptosporidium oocysts were detected in 2 samples (1 oocyst per 10 L and 2 oocysts per 10 L), Giardia was detected in 1 sample
(1 cyst per 10 L) and 1 sample was negative for both parasites.
Following the report of these results to Oslo VAV, a 'crisis meeting' was held involving members of the Oslo VAV crisis team, the Oslo Health Authority, the Food Safety Authority and the Public Health Institute and based both on the detection of E. coli and on the results of the parasitological analyses, it was decided to institute a boilwater notice for all areas of the city supplied with water from Oset treatment works. The authors of the present report were not consulted in reaching this decision. The boil-water notice was effectively in action from the morning of 17th October with communication to the city residents Table 2 . None of the positive samples were untreated water from Oset water treatment plant, but one positive sample on 17th October was from treated water from the plant. The other positive samples were from different points in the water distribution system in Oslo.
Additionally, two different boats which suspected that they might have loaded contaminated water in Oslo requested analysis of 10 L water samples for Cryptosporidium oocysts and Giardia cysts. The result from one boat (analysis conducted at NVH) was negative, whereas in the sample from the other boat (analysis conducted at Mlab, Stavanger), 2 Giardia cysts with excellent morphology and fluorescence characteristics were identified.
All the slides from the samples identified as positive at NVH were stored and subsequently molecular studies were conducted on 4 of these containing Cryptosporidium oocysts (1 from 15th October containing 2 Cryptosporidium oocysts, 2 from 17th October each containing 1 Cryptosporidium oocyst and 1 from 20th October containing 2
Cryptosporidium oocysts). The cover-slip from each slide was carefully removed and retained, top-side down, whilst 25 ml aliquots of AL lysis buffer (Qiagen GmbH, Germany)
were added to the slide wells which were carefully and gently scraped using a sterile scalpel blade. The buffer and scrapings were then pipetted into a microcentrifuge tube.
This process was repeated 4 times, collecting the buffer and scrapings into the appropriate tube for each slide, and then the cover-slip was replaced onto the slide which was then re-screened. For each slide the oocysts could no longer be detected.
The contents of each tube were re-suspended in Tris-EDTA buffer and held at 1008C for 1 hour, before the DNA was isolated using QIAamp DNA mini kit (Qiagen GmbH), using an overnight lysis step at 568C. PCR was conducted of the SSU rRNA gene using published primers (Xiao et al. 1999 ) and the following PCR conditions: 958C 15 min, 50 cycles of, 948C for 45 sec, 558C for 45 sec, 728C for 60 sec. A final elongation phase was at 728C for 10 min.
The primer concentration was 10 pmol, and for each sample the PCR was conducted in duplicate with either 3 ml or 4 ml of template. For each PCR, positive and negative controls were also included. Despite the PCR being conducted twice, visualisation of the PCR product by electrophoresis on 1% agarose gels and ethidium bromide staining did not demonstrate a positive result from either of the samples which had contained a single oocyst. However, from the two samples which had each contained 2 oocysts, a PCR product of the expected size (approximately 850 bp) was obtained, purified (High Pure PCR product purification kit;
Roche Diagnostics GmbH), and sequenced on both strands at MWG Biotech, Germany. Chromatograms and sequences were examined using Vector NTI Invitrogen
Software and sequence searches conducted using BLAST. Although only portions of the sequences for the 1st sample (from 15th October) were of sufficient quality to be of use, they demonstrated that at least one of the oocysts in this sample was C. hominis. Both forward and reverse sequences of the 2nd sample (from 20th October) were of good quality, with no double peaks, and demonstrated that at least one of the oocysts in this sample were C. parvum.
As at least one of the oocysts, from one of the initial samples in this incident before the boil-water notice had been implemented, was identified as being C. hominis, a species which generally only occurs in humans and not in the plethora of mammalian hosts associated with C. parvum infections, it is probable that the water supply had experienced a contamination event with faecal matter of human origin. This, together with the bacteriological findings, indicated that this was probably a post-treatment contamination event, which might have occurred in the water distribution system at an individual location. That the contamination was largely localised and was undetectable within a few days, suggests that the contamination event was likely to be a one-off incident, perhaps in association with a particular event such as maintenance work, rather than a severe or continuous fault within the distribution network. The oocysts in the later sample being demonstrated to be C. parvum might indicate contamination from either human sources (sewage leak) or from animals, possibly as an entirely separate event to the initial contamination incident.
Elevated numbers of Cryptosporidium infection or
Giardia infection associated with this incident were not observed amongst the population of Oslo, although more than usual numbers requested analysis for these parasites.
DISCUSSION
Issuing and rescinding a boil-water notice proposed that the implementation of boil-water notices, associated with suspected contamination of public water supplies by Cryptosporidium, is seldom a good idea (Irvine 2004) . The rationale behind this theory is multi-faceted and is based upon several concepts, some of which might be considered controversial, whereas several are broadly accepted. These include: † that adherence to a boil-water notice, both for individuals and for affected businesses, is disruptive, expensive and possibly dangerous (a theoretical increased risk of scalding injuries); † that if the boil-water notice is applied because of an outbreak then the notice is applied too late for prevention; † that if the boil-water notice is applied because of raised counts of oocysts in the water supply then it is possible that these oocysts are non-pathogenic to humans or nonviable, that there may be too few to cause infection, that the sampling system is so unrepresentative of the entire water system that raised counts may merely reflect clumping; † that because of the difficulties listed in the previous bullet point, oocyst counts in water do not assist in predicting if an outbreak is likely to occur; † that generally although the disease associated with infection is unpleasant, unless the individual is immunocompromised the disease is not life-threatening; † that many in the target population do not adhere to the advice, thus implying that it is wasted effort; † that the media create an unnecessary furore over such incidents; † that boil-water notices result in loss of faith in the water supply by consumers, which may be prolonged, or even indefinite.
As if in anticipation of such debate, when the new quality water regulations were first introduced in the UK regarding water analysis for Cryptosporidium, a guidelines Indeed, it may be true, and/or the public may believe it to be true, that the boil-water notice actually prevents infection occurring, as is its intention. Whilst this may not raise public confidence in the water supply per se, it may enhance the awareness of the public that the water supplier is striving to produce a safe and reliable product and service at a relatively low price. A very recently published report (Terragni et al. 2008 ) of a survey conducted by the Norwegian National Institute for Consumer Research (SIFO) in the wake of the Oslo incident demonstrates that of 868 Oslo residents asked, 97% were in total or partial agreement with the authorities informing the public about the detection of parasites in the drinking water, and only 5% considered that a boil-water notice was completely unnecessary.
Whilst the decision to issue a boil-water notice might be relatively simple, especially if particular criteria are fulfilled, the decision on when to rescind such a notice may not be so easily made. Hunter (2000) makes the point that at the outset of issuing advice to boil water, there should be a clear understanding regarding the criteria which should be fulfilled in order for it to be removed. Similarly, the practicalities for agreeing such criteria are discussed by Harrison et al. (2002) in the context of the cryptosporidiosis outbreak in Devon, UK during 1995. In the Irish outbreak, specific criteria were agreed to be fulfilled regarding rescinding of the boil-water notice, including Cryptosporidium oocyst levels in the distribution network to be no higher than 0. (2) An outbreak of giardiasis in Bristol, UK in 1985 in which the water system was contaminated, possibly during engineering work on the water main, and resulted in over 100 cases (Jephcott et al. 1986) . with 56 cases in which it was postulated that the water distribution had been damaged by tree roots and the sewer construction had been faulty (Neringer et al. 1987) .
(4) An outbreak of cryptosporidiosis in Ayrshire, UK in 1988 affecting many hundreds of individuals, in which a break-pressure tank was contaminated by irregular seepage of oocyst-containing water (possibly from cattle slurry spraying) (Smith et al. 1989 ).
(5) An outbreak of giardiasis in a correctional facility in Tennessee, USA in 1994 involving over 300 cases in which there was a cross-connection between potable and wastewater lines, and a fall in pressure in the potable water system probably caused wastewater to flow back into the potable water line (Kramer et al. 1996) .
(6) An outbreak of giardiasis in Washington, USA in 1995 involving 87 cases in which an illegal cross-connection had been made between a domestic water supply and an irrigation system at a plant nursery (Lee et al. 2002) .
(7) An outbreak of cryptosporidiosis in Kanagawa, Japan in 1994 with 461 cases recorded, in which municipal drinking water was contaminated with sewage through connecting pipes (Kuroki et al. 1996) . In general, analysis of post-treatment contamination outbreaks with parasites indicated that these have often resulted from cross-connection between potable water pipes and sewerage pipes, although agricultural sources of contamination have also occurred. Such cross-connection may be directly due to human error or perfidy, or due to environmental factors causing leakages in adjacent pipes, but loss of pressure may also be of importance. In the Oslo incident, no evidence of failure in the distribution network was detected; the factors which were investigated by Oslo VAV included construction work in the area, work on the distribution network itself, and loss of water pressure due to fire department activity.
CONCLUSIONS
A post-treatment water contamination incident in Oslo during October 2007 is described, in which low numbers of Giardia cysts and Cryptosporidium oocysts were detected in the distribution network supplied from a source in which these parasites are rarely found. These findings, along with microbiological evidence of contamination, were sufficient to result in a temporary and short-term boil-water notice being issued for the majority of Oslo residents. On the basis of this event, and others, we discuss the criteria for issuing, and rescinding, boil-water notices, and suggest that a 'stepwise' boil-water notice, directed only at those consumers at particular risk, might be appropriate in some instances when numbers of parasites detected are very low. We propose that, unless it is obvious that a gross contamination event has occurred, warranting immediate action, it is essential that all the relevant information is considered when deciding whether or not to issue a boil-water notice;
this not only includes data on oocyst or cyst counts, but archived data, other microbiological data, and biophysical and environmental data. It should also be realised by water providers that information on viability or genetic data may not be immediately or perhaps, ever, available and often the decision will need to be taken without such information.
That the Oslo incident was probably a post-treatment contamination event has been used to discuss the possibility of such events occurring. This seems to us to be increasingly important; as more water treatment works invest heavily in treatments to inactivate or remove parasites, it should also be emphasised that these will be of little worth if the network is not properly maintained or secured during maintenance work or if pressure breaks occur, which may result in post-treatment contamination events. In general, water samples which are analysed for Cryptosporidium and/or Giardia are either raw or treated water collected at the treatment works, and very rarely collected from the water distribution network. In the Oslo incident, the contamination event would probably not have been initially noticed, but for the fact that it occurred close to a pharmaceutical company which conducted its own microbiological analyses of the tap water. Whether a waterborne outbreak of infection might have occurred if these analyses had not been conducted, the source of which would probably not have been identified, is impossible to determine.
